free trade and the left, bis: from cobden to lenin
A week ago we discussed free trade, and specifically took a look at the classical mechanism by which free trade is supposed to improve overall outcomes, as measured by GDP.
As I described it, the value proposition of free trade is ambiguous at best: there is an intangible sense that a country might have a higher GDP with lower trade barriers, but with a side serving of misery as international competition forces some local industries to close, and without any guarantee about how that trade advantage would be distributed among the population. Why bother? And why is my news feed full of EU commissioners signing new trade agreements? Where are these ideas coming from?
stave 2
I asked around, placed some orders, and a week later a copy of Marc-William Palen’s Pax Economica came in the mail. I was hoping for a definitive, reasoned argument for or against free trade, from a leftist’s perspective (whatever that means). The book was both more and less than that. Less, in the sense that its narrative is most tightly woven in the century before the end of the second World War, becoming loose and frayed as it breezes through decolonization, the rise of neoliberalism, the end of history, and what it describes as our current neomercantilist moment. Less, also, in that Palen felt no need to summarize the classic economic arguments for free trade, leaving me to clumsily do so in the previous stave. And yet, the story it tells fills in gaps in my understanding that I didn’t even know I had.
To pick up one thread from the book, let’s go back to 1815. British parliament passes the Corn Laws, establishing a price floor for imported grain. This trade barrier essentially imposes a significant tax on all people who eat, to the profit of a small number of landowners. A movement to oppose these laws develops over the next 30 years, with Richard Cobden as its leading advocate. One of the arguments of the Anti-Corn Law League, which was actually a thing, is that cheaper food is good for workers; though wages might decline as bosses realize they don’t need to pay so much to keep their workers alive, relatively speaking workers will do better. More money left over at the end of the month also means more demand for other manufactured products, which is good for growing industry.
In the end, bad harvests in 1845 led to shortages and famine (yes, that one) and eventually a full repeal of the laws in 1846. Perhaps the Anti-Corn Law League’s success was inevitable: a bad harvest year is a stochastic certainty, and not having enough food is the kind of problem no government can ignore. In any case, the episode does prove the Corn Laws to be a front in a class war, and their repeal was a victory for the left, even if it occured under a Conservative government, and even if the campaign was essentially middle-class Liberal in character.
The repeal campaign was not just about domestic cost of living, however. Its exponents argued that free trade among nations was an essential step to a world of peaceful international cooperation. Palen’s book puts Cobden in context by comparison to Friedrich List, who, inspired by a stint in America in the 1820s, starts from the premise that for a nation to be great, it needs an empire of colonies to exploit, and to conquer and defend colonies, it needs a developed domestic industry and navy; and for a nation to develop its own industry, it needs protectionism. The natural state of empire is not exactly one of free trade with its neighbors.
The “commercial peace” movement that Palen describes cuts List’s argument short at “empire”: because there is no empire without war, a peace movement should scratch away at the causes of war, and the causes of the causes; a world living in pax economica would avoid imperial conflict by tying nations together through trade. It sounds idealistic, and it is, but it’s easy to forget that today we wage war through trade also: blockades and sanctions are often followed by bombs. Palen’s book draws clear lines from Cobdenism through such disparate groups as women’s peace societies, Christian internationalists, pre-war German socialists, and Lenin himself.
Marx understood history as a process of development, consisting of stages through which a society must necessarily pass on its way to socialism. This allies him with capitalism in many ways; he viewed free trade as a step towards a higher form of capitalism, which would necessarily lead to socialism. This, to me, is not a convincing argument in 2026: not only has the mechanistic vision of history failed to fruit, but its mechanism of plant closures and capital flight can be cruel and hard to campaign for politically. And yet, I think we do need a healthy dose of internationalism to remedy the ills of the present day: a jolt of ideals and even idealism to remind us that we are all travelling together on this spaceship Earth, and that those on the other side of a political line are just as much our brothers and sisters those on “our” side.
i went seeking clarity
When you tend Marxist, you know in your bones that although the road to socialism is rough and winding, the winds of history are always at your back; there is an in-baked inevitability of success that softens defeat. There is something similar in the Christian and feminist narrative strands that Palen weaves: a sense not that victory is inevitable, at least in this lifetime, but that fighting for it is a moral imperative, and that God is on your side. The campaign for free trade was a means to a moral end, one of international peace and shared prosperity. And this, in 2026, sounds... good, actually?
Again from our 2026 perspective, I cannot help but agree that a trade barrier is often an act of war; preliminary, yes, but on the spectrum. I have had enough freedom fries in my life to have developed an allergy to anything that tastes of my-side-of-the-line-is-better-than-yours. Though I have not yet read Klein and Pettis’s deliciously titled Trade Wars are Class Wars, I do know that among the 1.5 million people who died as a result of the sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s, Saddam Hussein was not on the list. Sometimes I feel like we learned the lessons of Cobdenism backwards: in order to keep the people starving, we must impose anew the Corn Laws.
Palen’s book leaves me with one doubt, and one big question. The doubt is, to what extent do the lessons of the early 1800s apply today? Ricardo’s contemporary comparative advantage theories presupposed that capital was relatively fixed in space; nowadays this is much less the case. The threat of moving the plant elsewhere is always present in all union drives everywhere. Though history rhymes, it does not repeat; it will take some creativity to transplant pax economica to the soils of the 21st century.
The bigger question, though, is as regards the morality of protectionism as practiced by more and less developed economies: when is it morally right for a country to erect trade barriers? Palen’s book does not pretend to answer this question. And yet, this issue was foremost in our minds, as we shut down Seattle in 1999, as we died in Genoa in 2001. (Forgive the collectivism, if you aren’t of this tribe (yet?), but it was a lived experience.) Free trade was a moral cause in 1835; how did it become immoral in 1995, at least to us?
world without end
Well. To answer that question, we need a history that picks up where Palen leaves off, and we have something like it in Quinn Slobodian’s Globalists, which we will look at next time. But before we go, two reflections.
One, in Europe we have kept the Corn Laws on the books, in a way, in the form of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In France the dominant discourse is very much in opposition to the free trade agreement with Mercosur, and the main reason is the threat to French farmers. The tradeoff to get the Mercosur agreement over the line were additional subsidies under the CAP, which are a form of trade barrier. And yet, the way the CAP is structured allocates most of the money in proportion to the surface area of a farm, which is to say, to the largest agribusinesses and to the largest landowners. Greenpeace just put out an excellent briefing arguing that the CAP is just a subsidy to the heirs of the Duchess of Alba and their ilk. Again, are we running the 19th century in reverse?
Secondly, and harder to explain... in the 2000s I listened a lot to an anarchist radio show hosted by Lyn Gerry, Unwelcome Guests. (Have you heard the eponymous tune? It makes me shiver every time.) Anyway I remember one episode which discussed the gift economy and hunter-gather economics, in which a researcher asked a member of that community what he would do if he came into a lot of food at one time: the response, as I recall, was that he would store it “in his brother”. He would give it to others. One day, if he needed it, they would give to him.
I know that our world does not work this way, but there is an element of truth here, in that it’s not reasonable for France to grow everything that it eats, to never trade what it grows, to make all its own solar panels, to write all software used within its borders. We live richer lives when we share and learn from each other, without regards to which side of the line our home is.
next
Still here? Gosh me too. Next time we will look at what the kids call the “1900s” and perhaps approach present day. Until then, commercial peace be with you!